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Abstract
Since the late 1990s the debate in The Netherlands on the transport of hazardous 
materials by rail has intensified. The reason for this debate is the fact that most 
of the Dutch railway nodes are located in city centres. Risk is described by a 
formula in which the probability of an accident is multiplied by its effect. 
Although the probability might not be large, the effects of an accident can be. 
This article describes the effects of a new dedicated freight railroad on the risks 
on the adjacent area of an existing railroad. The assumption is that risks are 
redistributed. However this does still not match the policy goals set by the Dutch 
government. This argument will be build upon available transport flow figures, 
documents on risk standards and a reflection on the earlier mentioned formula.
Keywords: Redistribution of risks, rail transport of hazardous materials, 
external safety policy.
1 Introduction
After a couple of disasters and near misses in The Netherlands, the Dutch 
government has chosen to focus more on the enforcement of external safety 
policy. In this paper external safety is defined as the amount of safety due to the 
production, transport and/ or use of hazardous materials [1]. External safety 
policy aims to lower risks for civilians to be killed due to accidents with 
hazardous materials and to prevent economical loss due to the large number of 
casualties and the destruction of parts of the built up area. This paper focuses on 
Figure 1: The Netherlands and a 
schematic representation of 
the Betuwe Railroad (black 
line) and the Brabant 
Railroad (dashed line). 
the implications of Dutch external 
safety policy on rail transport for urban 
areas in general and on the so called 
Brabant Railroad and Betuwe Railroad 
in particular (see Figure 1). At the 
moment there is a lot of concern 
regarding external risks in The 
Netherlands [2]. Structural measures 
are therefore needed to prevent
problems between external safety 
policy and urban development [3]. 
For the transport of hazardous 
materials by rail the problems 
concerning risks are mainly 
concentrated in the adjacent area of the 
Brabant Railroad. In 2007 a new 
railroad will be taken into operation. 
The Betuwe Railroad is designed to be 
a high quality and high speed freight 
rail connection between Germany and 
the Rotterdam harbor area. The railroad 
is not designed for the transport of 
people. 
It is assumed that when this railroad is taken into operation, risks in the Brabant 
Railroad area are reduced to acceptable levels. One could say that this is a 
structural measure which will also result in an urban development potential for 
the cities along the Brabant Railroad. The Association of Netherlands 
Municipalities, for this matter, expects ‘a lot’ of the Betuwe Railroad, especially 
for the communities in the adjacent area of the Brabant Railroad (VNG, p. 14
[4]). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the redistribution between the 
both railroads will result in a lowering of risks on the Brabant Railroad to an 
acceptable level and whether this is a structural measure to solve problems 
concerning external risks in the adjacent area of the Brabant Railroad. First, 
attention is paid to risks and external safety policy in The Netherlands and the 
Brabant Railroad in particular. Next, the effects of the new Betuwe Railroad on 
the transport of hazardous materials on the old Brabant Railroad will be given. 
This is followed by an outline on what this means for the calculated risks in the 
Brabant Railroad area. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion and a 
discussion.
2 External Safety and risk at the Brabant Railroad
As Rosmuller points out there are several definitions of risk. Basically risk 
consists of three components, the scenario, the probability of this scenario and 
the consequence of the scenario [5]. Risk is described here by a formula in which 
the probability of an accident is multiplied by its effect. In practice, 
transportation risks with hazardous materials are estimated with several 
mathematical models. One of them is the RBMII model [6]. This standardized 
model is free of use and distributed by the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management. This is done to satisfy a need for a relatively 
simple and standardized method to calculate risks [7]. This model will also be 
the benchmark model for all risk analyses to be made regarding transport of 
hazardous materials, except for highly difficult non-standard situations [6]. 
The RBMII model uses much more assumptions in its calculations than just 
probability and effect, but it basically boils down to this standard formula. 
Probability for example is calculated by multiplying data on the frequency of 
accidents and the probability of failure of the tank filled with hazardous 
materials. The frequency of accidents takes into account such facts as the speed 
of a rail track, the amount of level crossings and the amount of track switches. 
The effect of a possible derailment is calculated by such variables as the amount 
of hazardous materials released and their effects on people (“is the substance 
toxic or explosive?”), the amount of people living in the adjacent area and the 
distance between the center of the track and the built up area. 
The calculated data can be ‘visualized’ in two different ways. The first one is 
called Individual Risk (IR). This is the probability that an unprotected person 
dies due to an accident with hazardous materials per year on a certain spot when 
this person resides here a full year. The risk is visualized by dots on a map which 
function as spatial contours (see Figure 2). The maximum allowed risk as laid 
down in Dutch law, is 1*10-6. This means that a risk which is lower than once 
every million years is found acceptable according to Dutch policy. The second 
way to describe risk is in terms of Group Risk (GR). This is the annual 
probability that a group of people dies due to a severe accident. This is visualized 
by using the so called fN curve, where f resembles the frequency of an accident 
and N the number of people that can die in an accident (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2:  Schematic visualization of 
Individual Risk near a railroad.
Figure 3: Schematic reproduction of 
Group Risk.
The calculations made for the IR and the GR are based on two leading scenarios. 
For the IR the transport of category C3 materials (flammable liquids) is leading. 
Sometimes this is also influenced by toxic liquids or flammable gasses [8]. 
Because of the dominant influence of the C3 category, the 10-6 contour is never 
more than 30 meters from the Railroad. This results from the fact that a leaking 
tank in theory cannot create a puddle with a diameter of more than 30 meters. 
Moreover a minimum amount of more than 3000 tanks per year is needed to 
create a 10-6 contour outside of a railroad. For the GR the leading scenario is a 
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion). A BLEVE is caused 
when a tank filled with category A flammable gasses has an instant rupture 
combined with extreme heat and because of which the gas immediately catches 
fire to cause an explosion. This scenario can influence the GR value for more 
than 90%. 
For the IR asserts that vulnerable objects cannot be within the 10-6 contour. 
When the orientation value for the GR is met, a line can be drawn in figure 3 that 
doesn’t cross the diagonal curve representing the orientation value. The curve 
that is drawn is than still in the area below the orientation value. When it crosses 
the line and thus is drawn in the area above the orientation value, the GR is too 
high according to Dutch policy standards. However, the orientation value is not 
binding by law and acts more as a guideline for policy makers and planners to 
review their plans. In practice the GR orientation values are generally taken into 
account when deciding upon new projects with relation to urban planning [3].   
Nevertheless there are a number of spots in The Netherlands where risks are 
‘too’ high, as is shown in Figures 4 and 5. Both figures show the present 
situation. Figure 4 shows that within the IR 10-6 contour of the Brabant Railroad 
a large number of buildings are located. Figure 5 shows that there are several 
spots on the Brabant Railroad where the orientation value for the GR is not met, 
implying that the risk curve crosses the curve of the orientation value for group 
risk. A large number of spots with the same problem are not indicated with 
circles for reasons of clarity. There are forty to fifty spots where the orientation 
value is nearly met or violated, which means that there are forty to fifty spots 
where the GR is at least a factor 0.3 of the orientation value. These factors range 
from 0.3 to up to a factor of more than 10 times the orientation value [9].
There are six fairly large cities located adjacent to the Brabant Railroad and in all 
of them the quantified risk exceeds the orientation value for GR. These cities are 
Zwijndrecht (1), Dordrecht (2), Breda (3), Tilburg (4), Eindhoven (5) and Venlo 
(6). The largest city is Eindhoven with almost 210.000 inhabitants and the 
smallest is Zwijndrecht with little over 45.000 inhabitants [10]. Of these cities 
Breda and Venlo exceed the orientation value with a factor of 1 to 3. Of the other 
four cities Zwijndrecht, Dordrecht and Eindhoven exceed the orientation value 
with more than a factor 10. Apart from this they all have several buildings 
located within the 10-6 contours. Clearly this is due to the large amount of 
hazardous materials transported by rail through these cities each year. 
The general expectation is that total quantity for rail transport will grow in the 
future [11]. The growth numbers however are not clear with regard to various 
classes of hazardous materials. For category B2 a growth percentage of -10% to 
+16% is expected. However, for category A materials, from which the leading 
scenario is derived, a growth of 25-80% in the next 25 years is expected [12]. 
3 Effects of the Betuwe Railroad on the Brabant Railroad
In 2003 the total amount of transported hazardous materials on the Brabant 
Railroad was as shown in Table 1. The names of the parts of the railroad do not 
represent all of the cities but are deduced from official railway documents and 
refer to their technical name in the railroad network. The numbers (1) to (6) in 
the table refer to the cities as mentioned earlier in the text.
Figure 4: IR in The Netherlands: Map of The 
Netherlands and its freight railroad lines. The 
black ovals represent two parts of the Brabant 
Railroad where the IR 10-6 contours are 
located up to 20 meters from the railroad. The 
black squares have between 21 and 100 
building located within these contours [9].
Figure 5: GR in The Netherlands: Map of The 
Netherlands and its freight railroad lines. The 
black circles represent spots which exceed the 
orientation value for the GR with a factor 3-
10. The dashed circles exceed the GR with 
more than a factor 10 [9].
When the Betuwe Railroad is taken into operation, a number of transports will be 
redirected from the Brabant Railroad to the Betuwe Railroad. In a document by 
rail manager Prorail, the forecast for the transport of hazardous materials by rail 
is given for the year 2012 and beyond. The transport flows for all categories are 
given as they are estimated based on current trends in transport and economy and 
including the Betuwe Railroad in the rail system. In the future situation the 
transported amount of hazardous materials on the Brabant Railroad is estimated 
as given in Table 2:
Forecast for 2012 per matter categoryName of part of the 
Brabant railroad A B2 B3 C3 D3 D4
(1) Kijfhoek – (2) 
Dordrecht
4500 100 0 3250 1150 2000
(2) Dordrecht – Lage 
Zwaluw
4500 100 0 3250 1150 1000
Lage Zwaluw –
Zevenbergsehoek
- - - - - -iii
Zevenbergsehoek – (3) 
Breda Aansluiting
550 0 0 0 1150 300
(3) Breda Aansluiting –
(4) Tilburg aansluiting
4400 0 0 0 1150 300
(4) Tilburg aansluiting –
Boxtel
2850 0 0 0 1150 300
Boxtel –(5) Tongelre 
aansluiting
2850 3650iv 0 2500 1150 300
(5) Tongelre aansluiting-
(6) Venlo
2300 0 0 0 0 0
Realized transport in 2003 per categoryName of part of the 
Brabant railroad A B2 B3i C3 D3 D4
(1) Kijfhoek – (2) 
Dordrecht
6350 100 0 13150 1800 1300
(2) Dordrecht – Lage 
Zwaluw
6350 100 0 10700 1800 950
Lage Zwaluw –
Zevenbergsehoek
5200 100 0 10000 1800 950
Zevenbergsehoek – (3) 
Breda Aansluiting
2750 0 0 8200 1400 700
(3) Breda Aansluiting –
(4) Tilburg aansluiting
4850 0 0 8200 1400 700
(4) Tilburg aansluiting –
Boxtel
4850 0 0 7150 1400 450
Boxtel –(5) Tongelre 
aansluiting
4850 1900ii 0 8200 1400 500
(5) Tongelre aansluiting-
(6) Venlo
4650 50 0 6950 450 450
Table 1: Realized transport of hazardous materials on the Brabant Railroad 
in 2003 in numbers of tank wagons [13].
Table 2: Future transport figures on the Brabant Railroad [12].
4 Effects on the calculated risk
By comparing Tables 1 and 2, shifts in the amount of transported materials can 
be found. It is already pointed out that category A materials, contribute the most 
to the GR. Category C3 materials mainly contribute to the IR and also form the 
dominating category concerning the leading scenario. As is shown in table 2, the 
maximum amount of tank wagons is 3250 per year, which is a reduction of 9900 
tank wagons. The resulting amount is little more than the 3000 tank wagons 
which (as noted before) is a minimum to create a IR 10-6 contour outside of the 
railroad. However the extra 250 tank wagons will not cause a large contour 
outside of the railroad [9]. Therefore there will not be any vulnerable objects 
within this contour and the risks will be reduced to an, in terms of Dutch policy, 
satisfying level.
Looking at the quantified risks for the GR and the orientation value, the category 
mainly influencing the GR is category A, because of the BLEVE scenario. By 
comparing tables 1 and 2 for this category, percentages can be calculated by 
dividing the estimated transport flows for the Brabant Railroad in the future 
situation by the transport flows of the 2003 situation. From these percentages a 
decline in factors can be derived. Table 3 shows the present number of category 
A transport, the future number of transport and the differences in percentage and 
factor.










(1) Kijfhoek – (2) 
Dordrecht
6350 4500 -29% 1,41
(2) Dordrecht – Lage 
Zwaluw
6350 4500 -29% 1,41
Lage Zwaluw –
Zevenbergsehoek
5200 Unclear Unclear Unclear
Zevenbergsehoek – (3) 
Breda Aansluiting
2750 550 -80% 5,00
(3) Breda Aansluiting –
(4) Tilburg aansluiting
4850 4400 -9% 1,10
(4) Tilburg aansluiting –
Boxtel
4850 2850 -41% 1,69
Boxtel –(5) Tongelre 
aansluiting
4850 2850 -41% 1,69
(5) Tongelre aansluiting-
(6) Venlo
4650 2300 -49% 1,96
Based on Table 3 it can be concluded that the group risks will lower for the total 
Brabant Railroad. However this does not imply that the resulting risk levels will 
become lower than the orientation value. The way in which risk is calculated, 
through multiplying the probability of an accident and the effects, implies a 
Table 3: Difference in percentages and factors of transported category A materials 
in the ‘present’ (2003) situation and in the future (2012) situation on the 
Brabant Railroad.
linear relation. This means that if the effects or the probability lowers with a 
certain factor, the risks will be lowered with the same factor. In this case the total 
quantity of transport of hazardous materials is lowered with a certain factor and 
therefore the probability is lowered. As seen in the right column, on all parts of 
the Brabant Railroad the probability is lowered with a factor between 1,1 and 
1,96, except for the part from ‘Zevenbergsehoek’ to ‘Breda aansluiting’. This is 
also a part of the Brabant Railroad where the population density is not that high 
and where consequently no problems with regards to the orientation value of the 
GR are expected.
As far as the other parts of the Brabant Railroad are concerned, the situations 
will not sufficiently improve. In Zwijndrecht and Dordrecht  (‘Kijfhoek –
Dordrecht’), Tilburg (‘Tilburg – aansluiting’) and Eindhoven (‘Tongelre 
aansluiting’) the GR is at least three times higher than the orientation value. 
Especially Zwijndrecht, Dordrecht and Eindhoven are problem areas with a GR 
of more than ten times the orientation value. Because of the linear relation this 
means that risks are lowered with factors between 1,1 and 1,96. To stay within 
the orientation value for GR, these factors should therefore be higher, up to a 
factor of at least ten. So, although the effects of the Betuwe Railroad are 
significant and the situation is improving, the future situation will not be as good 
as Dutch policy would prescribe it to be.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether the redistribution of transport of 
hazardous materials between an old and a new railroad in The Netherlands will 
result in a lowering of risks along the old railroad, crossing several cities, up to 
an acceptable level. The underlying question is whether this policy strategy of 
building a new dedicated railroad is an attractive strategy to solve problems 
concerning external risks in the adjacent area of the city-crossing old railroad. In 
the adjacent area of the Brabant Railroad in The Netherlands there are a lot of 
spots where the risks exceed the goals set by Dutch government. One of the 
supposed solutions for less external risks at the Brabant Railroad is the new 
Betuwe Railroad. This dedicated freight railroad will be taken into operation in 
2007 and should facilitate a large amount of the transport switching from the 
Brabant Railroad. As this paper points out, the transport flow of hazardous 
materials from the Brabant Railroad to the Betuwe Railroad is significant, but 
still is not enough to lower the Group Risk (GR) up to the generally accepted 
level or lower. For the Individual Risk (IR) asserts that the future situation shows 
a 10-6 contour outside of the railroad for a small part of the Brabant Railroad, but 
that this contour is too small to cause problems with possibly vulnerable objects.
In The Netherlands there is no binding rule that determines that the orientation 
value for the GR should not be violated. Therefore it is possible to deviate from 
these norms when having a good motivation. This implies that new or ‘extra’ 
urban development in already densely populated city centers is still possible even 
when the orientation value for the GR is not met. Whether this is a smart thing to 
do is debatable [14]. Apart from the question if this is smart, one can also argue 
that this implies that either external safety is not taken seriously or that urban 
development ambitions will be frustrated [2]. Finally, one can also argue that 
lowering the transport of hazardous materials on the Brabant railroad even more, 
will either undermine economical growth or can cause problems elsewhere due 
to a shift in transport modality or due to more transport on other parts of the rail 
network which are possibly located in dense urban areas as well.
This article merely tends to emphasize the necessity for a new or better way of 
directing the transport of hazardous materials by rail. Because of the fact that in 
The Netherlands the Betuwe Railroad will not have a structural influence on the 
improvement of risks as much as pursued, consequently in the near future there 
will still be a lot of difficulties to combine urban development, external safety 
policy and transport of hazardous materials by rail. In future research done by 
this author, an answer will be sought on the question whether it is possible to 
apply other policy strategies and if so, how this should be done.
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i This is accounted for chloride gas which is hardly transported in The 
Netherlands as a whole and not foreseen to be transported on this railroad at all.
ii These numbers are due to a supply route from the south which crosses the 
Brabant Railroad.
iii The forecast is unclear on this part of the Brabant Railroad.
iv These numbers are due to a supply route from the south which crosses the 
Brabant Railroad.
